Over this year’s Holiday break, I was an onlooker at our family’s annual game of Risk, the classic game of war and international diplomacy. For my eight-year-old cousins, it was their first time playing, so I, a seasoned Risk veteran, decided to take a back seat; I also wasn’t feeling well. As the temper tantrums, accusations of cheating, and highly questionable military decisions ensued, they were introduced to the complications of geopolitics for the very first time. In attempting to broaden their authority, if not just survive, each of the three young politicians, at times, were compelled to negotiate seemingly unrealistic compromises that were a necessity to each other’s success, often combining forces to fend off a stronger force. Glancing over at my dad, I knew exactly what he was thinking; the perfect opportunity for him to recite his favorite paradoxical quote: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
The proverb the enemy of my enemy is my friend originates from the Arthashastra, an ancient political written work in Sanskrit. Thought to have been dating back to the 4th-century b.c, its meaning was valuable long before it made its way to my dad and cousins playing Risk. Centuries later, a Latin translation, “Amicus meus, inimicus inimici mei,” gained widespread notoriety concerning political discussions across much of Europe. Plainly, the phrase is conveying that being allied is inevitable when two potentially opposing parties possess a common enemy. It signifies a party that holds dissenting values to your own and if challenged, poses a threat to your security, peace, and most importantly, core interests.
There is no better example than our friends in Europe: the Brits and the French. Although trusting allies today, they were not always this way. For the greater part of the past millennium, the two historical kingdoms were the most bitter of enemies, constantly engaging in territorial, dynastic, ideological, and religious foment contretemps. Then, in the middle of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, while the two were caught sleeping on Eastern Europe, Germany quickly became Europe’s largest economic—and military power. All of a sudden France and Britain’s core interests shifted from pointlessly detesting each other; their respective enemy was now Germany, motivating them to fulfill their destinies to become friends. Either could have seized the opportunity to seek retribution, but the objective at stake wasn’t to rehash previous grievances, but rather to address their most pressing interest: survival.
So why do I bring this up?
In the past few decades, the PRC’s global prominence has increased greatly. And with a population, nearly three times the size of a combined US and Russia, it was only a matter of time before they translated their robust population into effectively managing their resources for economic growth. One of the first to recognize the People’s Republic of China’s potential influence? The Nixon Administration. I know, it surprised me too. The unfavorable Vietnam War was unfolding at the time, backed by the US in the South and the two communist superpowers, in the Soviet Union and the PRC, in the North. Adding the Korean War stalemate transpiring just years before, it was known that the United States and PRC were far from friends. So when President Nixon made his announcement that in 1972, he would be visiting China, the disheartened American people were taken aback. The Soviet Union had emerged as the main supporter of North Vietnam, seeing the PRC somewhat fade into the background. Nixon’s trip to Beijing was a pursuance of Soviet leverage. If the US could ally with the PRC, a border-disputing enemy of the Soviet Union, they could be placed in the middle of the two communist regimes, making the Soviet Union, their widely known core interest, more submissive to US policy. The Soviet Union and PRC’s burgeoning conflict had made the PRC a friend to the US.
I spoke with Dr. Gerry Blaney, who specializes in both historical and international geopolitics, about the United States and Russia’s political relationship concerning China’s rising applicability.
“Although not likely at the moment, it is not inconceivable that the two will ally in the future… the main player to account for is a threat of individual interest, and what that perception looks like to its competitors,” he replied. “Right now, Russia’s core interests are centered around Europe and Central Asia. Considering their population, wealth, and the federal government is concentrated on their Western front, they are more focused on protecting traditional Russian values and resources, continuing a strong trade relationship with their biggest trade partner, the EU, and maintaining a stable buffer around them in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, of whom are not particularly fond of Russia. From the encroaching European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on their Western front, what they see as an extension of the United States, they have given Eastern Asia the very large East Asian border, very little attention.
“The United States is a little different,” says Blaney. “Although historically isolationist in their core interests, they inherited the global authority title when Europe’s colonial powers began to fall. In addition to being the “international police,” their core interests are aligned with those of Western Europe.”
Here’s how China becomes involved. The only way that the United States and Russia ally is if China threatens the core interests I mentioned above. And although it seems unlikely at the moment, it is very likely that either or both the United States and Russia’s respective interests are threatened in the near future. China’s growing “One Belt One Road” initiative, is a plan that if successful, would monumentally change Eurasian trade. Running right below Russia into the heart of Europe, Russia’s sturdy relationship with the EU could falter, and a new, (unwanted in the mind of Russia), presence could arrive in Eastern Europe and Central Asia—the very region they desire to control. Historically, superpowers have sought out buffer states between them and their competitors. That’s why we see Russia doing everything in its power to uphold Ukraine, Belarus, and of recent, Kazakhstan, as weak, Russian-lionizing states, not allowing them to flounder to Western ideals. To worsen matters for Russia, the Sino-Russian border is the sixth-longest border in the world, measuring at over 4000 kilometers. With Russia’s interests fixated in another continent, who will stop China when they begin to desiderate Russia’s coveted resources. Will it be Russia? I don’t think so. Russia and China’s long-standing facade of a friendship is a misconception that has tilted in the balance, favoring China. Fifty years ago, when the two superpowers prided themselves on their healthy alliance, it was Russia who had the stronger economy. And now, it is now China that is magnitudes more powerful and is pulling away. Their relationship has never been an equal relationship—one that we know President Nixon tried to take advantage of.
China, still being a country of mostly regional interests, is unlikely to threaten American interests for the time being. Though their investments in Africa and Latin America, as well as their first naval base in the Atlantic Ocean, are sure to bring the US to the table; it’s an attempt to show the world that they’re a force to be reckoned with. The US is lucky their next-door neighbor’s core interests are syrup and ice hockey.
Below is a chart of the United States and Russia’s threat perceptions between the three countries:
| Threat Perception (1-10), 1 is Least and 10 is Most Worried | ||
| United States | Russia – 5 | China – 5.5 |
| Russia | China – 3 | United States – 9 |
Right now, the United States and Russia are concerned more with each other than with China. Russia sees the US, and the West for that matter, as the greatest threat to their core interests. An emotional tension that has been brewing for almost a century, it may take the transfer of Russian power to recognize who their true enemies really are. And while the US is swaying somewhere in the middle, potentially leaning towards China, both countries are making moves on the global stage, requiring the US to get involved, e.g. Ukraine, Taiwan, etc. But let’s think about Nixon’s trip to Beijing. If a core interest today is threatened, and it is reasonable to understand that it very well could be, it is more than conceivable that a future American president flies to Moscow to leverage China, or the opposite to Washington D.C—as a cry for help. Everyone knows what happens when you get too comfortable in Risk. Make sure to play your best cards in the present, but don’t sleep on your potential enemies. In the blink of an eye, they might just come up and…
