In his well-known essay “The End of History?”, economist Francis Fukuyama wrote: “it matters very little to us what strange thoughts occur to the people of Burkina Faso…” He was wrong. It matters a great deal what goes on in Burkina Faso: to the 22 million Burkinabe, to the more than 1.2 billion Africans, and to all people concerned with the future of the Earth’s fastest-growing continent.
In some respect, though, Fukuyama had a point; Burkina Faso is a nation which very rarely, if ever, graces the consciousness of the non-Francophone world. The country is perhaps only known for its wonderfully named capital city (Ouagadougou), and, amongst leftists in particular, its playing host to revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara in the mid 1980s. More recently though, Burkina Faso has gained notoriety for toppeling its democratically elected government, adding another link to the “coup belt”–a string of seven African states which, beginning in 2021, have deposed their governments and installed military juntas–which now stretches the width of North Africa, the Red Sea to the Atlantic.
A map of the “coup belt” as of August 2023 (IDEA, 2023)
Colonial Past / Sankara [Early Kingdoms-1983]
What is today Burkina Faso has throughout its history been a part of a variety of imperial projects, some imposed regionally (such as the relatively well known Mossi and in particular Songhai kingdoms) and others, more specifically the French, imposed from the smoke, dust, and foreign antiquity-filled map rooms of late 19th century Berlin. The nomenclature of the area has likewise changed dramatically over time, first being referred to as Upper Senegal-Niger (1904-1920), and later by the name Upper Volta (1920-1984)–derived from the red, white, and black Volta rivers. As is made apparent by the ‘84 name change, the 1980s marks a seismic shift in the political history of the country, a shift enacted by the aforementioned Capt. Thomas Sankara.
Following French-granted independence–a term which should be used loosely in this context–in 1958, a series of unpopular puppet leaders, their strings comfortably in the pocket of French private interest, battled for power over the Voltanese and their resources; coups took place in 1966, 1980, 1982, and finally, for our present purposes, in 1983, during which Sankara and his supporters gained control over the country.
An outspoken Marxist, Pan-Africanist, and Anti-Imperialist, almost all of Sankara’s political projects were aimed at maximally improving the lives of the Voltanese people. In a matter of weeks, his government vaccinated some 2.5 million children for meningitis, yellow fever, and measles. Literacy, which lay dormant at an appalling 13% in 1983, was raised nearly sixfold in five years. Women were appointed to high ranking government positions and encouraged to seek political and professional life, the barbaric practice of female genital mutilation was outlawed, and maternity leave was instituted nationwide. Keenly aware of the Sahel’s* threatening expansion into the tropics, he planted 10 million trees to safeguard Voltanese agriculture and wildlife from desertification.
Dismantling corruption was at the forefront of Sankara’s political agenda; the old Voltanese government’s fleet of Mercedes cars was sold off and replaced with the cheapest vehicle available for purchase in the country at that time: the tiny Renault 5; the salaries of all public servants, including his own, were lowered (the president’s salary to a mere $450 a month); government officials were barred from purchasing first-class airline tickets and hiring chauffeurs. Even Sankara’s already-modest personal office was deprived of air conditioning, the cost of which was deemed to be too steep.
The awe-inspiring might of engineering which is the Renault 5 (Wikimedia Commons, 1972)
Skepticism of foreign aid, especially those loans “graciously” and never-endingly doled out by the International Monetary Fund, was another hallmark of his governance; during his time in office, the country received precisely $0 in foreign funding. Despite this, rail and roadways were built both efficiently and effectively, linking rural villages, as were more than 350 schools–all in a span of just four years. Feudal landlords, always much too enticed by the glint of the French treasury, were stripped of all political power, their land redistributed to the peasantry–the effect of which was a massive spike in food production (wheat production, for example, rose from 1700 kg per hectare in 1983 to 3800 kg per hectare by 1987) and inevitable food self-sufficiency.
Not already in love with the man? Readers should make note of his love for guitar (even single-handedly composing the national anthem) and all-female, motorcycle-bound personal guard. Whilst his seemingly endless list of accomplishments speaks volumes to his legacy, so too does perhaps his most superficial, and simultaneously most intensely significant, policy, a further and final change to the country’s moniker: “Burkina Faso,” derived from a combination of the country’s three most widely-spoken languages, which translates to ”the land of upright (or incorruptible) men.”
Thomas Sankara in 1986 (Progressive International, 2021)
1987 Coup, 2015 Election, 2020 Election, and 2021 Coup [1987-2021]
Unfortunately, name alone was not sufficient to deter the resurgence of corruption in Burkina Faso. Sankara was murdered, shot in a French-sponsored coup by henchmen of former ally and high-ranking official Blaise Compaoré, who soon assumed the presidency. Compaoré’s grip on power was notably tighter than Sankara’s, and the man led the country for the following three decades, presiding over a period of political and economic instability, the gradual undoing of Sankarist reforms, and ever-lengthening term limits for his office. In 2014, following a further attempt by the Compaoré administration to extend the presidential term limit, mass protest broke out across the country; demonstrators proved to be immensely successful, torching the ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) headquarters in addition to the National Assembly among other government buildings, eventually forcing Compaoré into exile in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire.
Despite the chaos of 2014, the year marked a turning point for democracy in Burkina Faso. A general election was staged following Compaoré’s exile, the results of which produced a victory for the MPP’s (Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès, or the People’s Movement for Progress) Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Kaboré, alongside fellow high-ranking officials, jumped from the sinking CDP ship in 2014, founding and filling seats in the newly-created MPP in a Theseus-esque move. The re-brand won over Burkinabè, with the MPP winning nearly twice as many votes as the runner-up party. Despite having served in one political office or another since 1989 (even working as Prime Minister from 1994-1996), Kaboré’s background was comfortably financial in nature, having headed Burkina Faso’s largest bank since the days of Sankara. His background in finance, abandoning of the corrupt CDP, and landslide electoral victory all gave the impression that Ouagadougo was heading in a new, exciting, direction. The optimism which the MPP was able to inject into the country in 2015, however, was short lived. By 2020, the likelihood of re-election was by no means promising, in particular due to the rising threat posed, especially to the country’s north, by Jihadist rebels. The military in particular came to strongly oppose Kaboré’s handling of the situation, and when widespread protest erupted following allegations of improper election practice, they seized the opportunity. On January 24th, 2021, a group of army officers banded under the newly formed PMSR (Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration, Mouvement Patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration) took control of the government, placing Kaboré under house arrest.
2021 Coup, Countercoup, and the Future of Traoré’s Leadership [2021-2024]
Now in charge was Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, a man who, in the years leading up to the 2021 coup, had spent his days working diligently up the ranks of the Burkinabé military. He had previously come into direct conflict with Kaboré, especially over the role of the Russian Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization operating from Syria to Venezuela, though most notably in Ukraine, in tackling Jihadists. Kaboré’s opposition to the involvement of Wagner forces, stemming from a fear of alienating the West, is a position both increasingly untenable and unpopular in West Africa. Russian flags were even spotted being flown by supporters of the coup in Ouagadougou, sparking much domestic debate as well as fear abroad.
The junta’s raison d’être is based entirely around the threat of Sahelian rebels; the interim government has routinely promised that democratic elections are on the horizon, though only after military forces have sufficiently dispatched of the northern threat. So it did not bode well for Damiba’s government, therefore, when only eight months after seizing power more than 40% of the country had fallen to the rebels, an increase since Kaboré’s deposition. In response to the crisis, Damiba blamed other elements of the PMSR government, scattering early supporters to the political winds and personally assuming the office of defense minister while simultaneously appointing a new head of national defense. Unsurprisingly, losing half the county, blaming your friends, and promoting yourself is not a particularly savvy string of political moves, and the PMSR hastily deposed Damiba less than a year after he had assumed office; his whereabouts are presently unknown, though three officers were tried for allegedly aiding his escape.
By September 30th, 2021, the 35 year old Ibrahim Traoré had assumed the office of interim president–by now one of the world’s statistically most dangerous jobs. Scholars of Sankara are quick to draw parallels between Traoré’s government and that of 1983-1987; in addition to his youth, Traoré is often spotted sporting a dashing red beret in proper Sankaraist fashion. On a slightly less superficial note, the man is intensely vocal in his opposition to corruption, claiming to have witnessed “suitcases of money” change hands under the Kaboré government. Well known for his rigidness and intense belief in government transparency, Traoré has proven to be an intensely popular figure both domestically and in neighboring states.
President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traoré (Medium, 2023)
Traoré is similarly influenced by Marxist and anti-Imperialist thought, having expelled all French troops stationed in Burkina Faso early last year. Unsurprisingly, the French have never been a popular presence in their former colonial holdings, though they have certainly proved to be an unrelenting one; France has permanently pegged the currencies of 14 African states, including Burkina Faso, to the Euro through a modern-day colonial currency known as the CFA Franc. In addition to being unpopular, the CFA Franc severely limits economic self-determination, effectively placing monetary policy for supposedly independent states firmly in the hands of the European Central Bank. To add further injury to injury, the “agreement” requires that CFA Franc-using nations deposit half their foreign currency reserves in the French treasury. (An arrangement a certain former US president might describe as “The worst deal in the history of deals, maybe ever.)
Whatever his reasons may be for opposing French influence, Traoré’s position is a popular one, though observers are concerned about his alienation of the West potentially leading to Russia establishing a firm bulwark in West Africa. Although he never received it, Sankara was never opposed to monetary aid from the Second World during his time in office, and Traoré ascribes to similar thinking. While the junta denies a Wagner presence in the country, it has purchased arms from Russia in addition to recruiting Russian military instructors.But despite forging new ties with autocrats abroad, Traoré’s government maintains its promise to hold elections in July of this year. And considering Burkina Faso’s abundance of profitable mines–chiefly gold, zinc, copper, manganese, phosphate, and limestone–as well as its inconcrete position in a polarizing global system, both the world’s most and least powerful will soon be looking to the country and the future of Traoré’s leadership, as well as the future of socialist ideas on the continent perhaps most in need of them. After all, Burkina Faso is a rich country, and, to quote Michael Parenti, “it is only the people that are poor.”
