Editor’s Note
Dear Readers,
Thank you for continuing to read and support The Fieldston Political Journal!
As a publication dedicated to discourse around often contentious topics, we present a variety of issues, from cultural angst to existential threats, that compel our attention. Each subject is a flashpoint. We feel a further obligation to include articles discussing recent events in the Middle East. We understand discussion of these issues may be hard for some, so we tried to approach these articles with added sensitivity. We’ve asked two writers to be very brave; to be ambassadors to dialogue and bridge building. In order to maintain a diversity of articles, we have created a special feature within this edition: Two articles, each discussing the Conflict with alternative perspectives, will face each other on the page. Despite their analytical sweep, these articles represent the perspective of merely two students on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict. We recognize that there is a wide array of opinions held about this nuanced conflict and we hope that these articles are just the beginning of a greater conversation in the Fieldston community. Everyone at FPJ stands behind the intellectual forays made by the authors in an expository form.
For this edition, we are allowing readers to send letters to us that respond to an article/s in this edition. We hope you will take advantage of this opportunity to create respectful dialogue surrounding important political issues. If there is a letter that we particularly like, we may publish it in the next edition of the FPJ (with the author’s permission). You can email these letters to 24twsullivan@ecfs.org and 24tswaxman@ecfs.org.
It should be noted that this article and Talia Waxman’s article titled “An Attempt at Understanding the Israel-Hamas Conflict” are presented side-by-side in our printed edition, and the two articles are intended to supplement each other. We encourage readers to explore both authors’ views on the issue.
Sincerely,
Theo Sullivan and Talia Waxman
Introduction
I often hear Americans say that there was a “peace” between Israel and the Palestinians before October 7th, and that Hamas single-handedly shattered that peace. When Hamas did the unthinkable and attacked Israel they did so knowing they were provoking a massacre of Gazan civilians and Hamas members alike. Without any right to, Hamas risked the lives of two million Gazans. It was a fait accompli. They carried out the attack despite the costs, because they felt they had no alternative. For the Palestinian people, the “peace” which proceeded October 7th was never peaceful. It was what military strategists like Carl Von Clausewitz have called “war by other means.” Under the internationally recognised laws of war, killing civilians intentionally or indiscriminately is never justified. However, It is important to understand what motivates these brutal attacks in order to prevent them from happening again. If there is no understanding of what motivates attacks like the one on October 7th, then they will continue long after Hamas, or even Gaza, is eradicated.
When Hamas’ Qassam Brigades crossed the Israeli border at the Kissufim/Al-Karara on October 7– killing, kidnapping and brutalizing Israeli soldiers and civilians alike– the group reportedly did it to intentionally spark a greater conflict. Taher El-Nounou, a Hamas media adviser, told the New York Times, “I hope that the state of war with Israel will become permanent on all the borders, and that the Arab world will stand with us.” Hamas appears to have seen the attack as a kind of collective suicide, designed to provoke a degree of retaliation from Israel that would outrage the Arab world and make martyrs of Gaza. They were aware that the much larger and better funded Israeli military would respond with vastly disproportionate force and they were not dissuaded. By provoking that retaliation, Hamas knew the response would be excessive and apocalyptic. They hoped that it would provoke a humanitarian crisis that would lead the world to condemn Israel and would recalibrate the politics of the Middle East by risking a much larger series of wars with regional players. The attack was a knowingly costly move– a last resort.
Although critics have called the attack an expression of a religious fundamentalist ideology, rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and linked to Iran, it was a desperate and pragmatic move, born within the circumstances of a 75 year occupation with no clear way out.
Background
To understand these circumstances, you must understand the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The territory once known as Palestine had, under British and Ottoman rule, been a multi-ethnic and multicultural home to Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike. But in 1947 the United Nations, an incredibly young organization with only a quarter of its current members, voted to partition Palestine, giving the majority of the land to the Jewish minority (now swollen by Jewish Holocaust refugees fleeing Europe). Moreover, the UN assured the creation of an Israeli state but not a Palestinian state next to it. Neighboring Arab nations attacked the young nation of Israel, arguing that the displacement of half of Palestine violated the UN charter and article 49 of the Geneva convention. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon failed; Israel defeated its neighbors. By the end of the war, Israel had expelled 700,000 Palestinians from their homes and killed 15,000 more who failed to evacuate their homes fast enough. Those displaced became refugees, the majority of which re-settled in Gazan refugee camps or dispersed across Jordan and Lebanon. Today, more than five million Palestinian refugees are still scattered across the Middle East with neither a permanent home nor citizenship.
In 1967, Israel attacked its Arab neighbors in a pre-emptive strike against an anticipated attack. In only six days, Israel captured Gaza and the Sinai peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan heights from Syria. They then held on to those territories, expanding far beyond the 1947 UN partition plan.
In 1973, Egypt recaptured the Sinai in a surprise attack. In the following armistice negotiations, The Camp David Accords of 1978-79, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat agreed to recognize Israel. In return, Israel, under Menachem Begin, agreed to establish a Palestinian state. Only Egypt kept up their end of the agreement.
The Palestinians not displaced from Israeli-controlled territory were left living under an Israeli military occupation on the West Bank of the Jordan River or in the Gaza Strip–a pocket of territory along the Mediterranean and next to the Egyptian Sinai. They were subjected to different laws than Jewish Israelis, meeting the legal definition of apartheid. They faced onerous and often humiliating restrictions on their movements, curtailment of their rights, destruction of their property and restrictions of their business activities. Unlike their Jewish neighbors, they could not bring near or extended family to live with them in Israeli occupied territory. And all the while, more and more Palestinians were displaced from their homes as more and more Jewish settlers moved into the occupied territories, at that time including both the West Bank and Gaza. The ever-expanding and illegal settlements made a contiguous Palestinian state impossible, steadily crushing any hope of Palestinian self-determination.
In 1987–twenty years after Israel captured the West Bank–Palestinian frustration at the military occupation erupted in what is now known as the First Intifada, a long period of riots characterized by stone throwing in a David and Goliath-esque gesture against Israeli rule. During the First Intifada, Palestinian attacks killed 100 Israelis and 60 soldiers, while Israel killed more than 1,000 Palestinians and many more were severely beaten. More than 20 Palestinians were killed before the first Israeli death.
Hamas emerged in the context of the intifada, initially dedicating itself to the complete eradication of Israel. The group, whose Arabic name means the Islamic Resistance Movement, was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, they also engaged in missionary and charitable work, extending deep roots into Palestinian society.
The First Intifada ended in the early 1990s with the Oslo Accords between Israel and the main Palestinian political leadership at the time, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (a group which Israel had previously denounced as anti-Jewish terrorists). Under the Accords, the PLO agreed to relinquish their claims to 78 percent of historic Palestine, and, in exchange, Israel agreed to eventually recognize Palestinian self-rule in the remaining area, mainly the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas’s opposition to the deal came to define the movement. Hamas leaders argued that Oslo was a one-sided surrender to Israel with no guarantees for Palestinians, and with the failure of the deal Hamas leaders today claim vindication.
In 2006, under heavy international pressure, Israel withdrew 14,000 settlers and held an election in Gaza. To their surprise, Hamas won a narrow victory.
When Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, Israel and the PA refused to accept the results. After a battle between the Palestinian factions, Hamas kicked the Palestinian Authority out of Gaza. Israel, in turn, tightened their blockade around Gaza, citing security concerns and claiming that Gaza was now Hamas’ sole responsibility. Since their electoral victory, Hamas has tried to organize government services including ministries of health, education, and internal security, all under difficult circumstances and with mixed results.
My Argument
In many ways, the obligations of governance changed Hamas. In 2017, the group adopted a new, more moderate charter, contradicting long standing anti-Jewish language about “our battle with Jews” and replacing it with less divisive language such as “Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.” Even if we might suspect Hamas’ professed moderation was mere subterfuge, their actions displayed some willingness to cooperate with the Jewish state and Netanyahu’s government. Hamas has sat out clashes between Islamic Jihad, another militant group present in Gaza, and the IDF, leading some to believe that Hamas was taking a less militant stance. Working through intermediaries, Hamas successfully negotiated an agreement with Israel that expanded the number of Gazans permitted to work in Israel and increased the amount of Qatari humanitarian aid allowed through Israel’s blockade. By negotiating with Israel, Hamas is effectively recognizing its existence, even if they don’t recognize Israel on paper. And in 2021, Hamas reached a deal to become part of the Palestinian Authority, which would have required accepting the goal of two states–one Jewish, one Palestinian. (Israel, though, blocked the Palestinian elections required for the deal, and the current leaders of the Palestinian Authority used that as an excuse to scrap it). Hamas has certainly grown more pragmatic since its creation.
So why did the group suddenly pivot to a self-destructive attack on October 7th?
Because, to many Palestinians, Palestine is forced to choose between slow, quiet eradication or martyrdom. The internationally recognized and peaceful Palestinian Authority, once promised to be the nucleus of a Palestinian state, had long ago lost any legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians. They remained complacent for thirty years as the situation deteriorated for everyday Palestinians. For better or worse, because of the October 7th attack and Israel’s devastating response, Hamas has now upstaged the Palestinian Authority or any other faction as the standard bearer of Palestinian nationalism and resistance.
Even before Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, Israel had already created prison-like conditions in Gaza. Israel prevented many Palestinians from working outside of Gaza and built concrete walls around the strip to prevent Gazans from traveling to the West Bank, splitting families and clearly violating the Oslo Accords. In 2001, Israel bombed and destroyed the only Gazan airport, further imprisoning the civilians of Gaza. Since 2007, the year Gaza became a more independent, though circumscribed territory, Israel and the Israeli-allied government in Egypt have enforced a draconian blockade of Gaza, limiting vital imports and exports to below their 2007 levels. The population of Gaza has grown by 50% over that period, meaning half of current Gaza residents are children. Israel even restricts Gazan fishing rights, not allowing Gazan fishermen more than six kilometers from shore. Because of this long-term siege on Gaza, 61% of Gazans require food assistance and 46% are unemployed. 78% of piped water in Gaza is considered unfit for human consumption. To put all this in context, Gaza is roughly the size and population of Queens. Gazans are no more free than a prisoner in a cell, free to move about within four walls so long as their captor remains sympathetic enough to allow food and water in. Although Israel disclaimed responsibility for Gaza after 2007, the United Nations still calls Gaza an occupation.
For Palestinians in the West Bank, living under the governance of the Israeli-recognized and peaceful Palestinian Authority, prospects are no better. The West Bank faces “creeping annexation,” as former United States Ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer called it. There are now 700,000 Israelis living in 150 settlements and 128 outposts in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, many of them attracted by the low cost of living. 60% of land in the West Bank is under illegal Israeli control. Palestinians are only allowed to build on 18% of the land, divided up into an archipelago of enclaves without hope of becoming a contiguous state. Netanyahu has only increased settlement construction since he first took power in 1996. Palestinians need to apply for Israeli permits to live and farm on whatever land the settlers do not yet control. On top of this, settler violence has risen, often unpunished by the Israeli government or supposedly independent Palestinian Authority. This year, before October 7th, Israeli settlers and soldiers killed more than 200 West Bank Palestinians. 150 more were killed in the first month following October 7th. Settlers, under the protection of the Israeli Defense Force, routinely uproot native olive trees and harass Palestinians. At this very moment Palestinians in the West Bank with no connection to Hamas are losing their homes to extremist settlers.
The Long Shadow of Oslo
Palestinians once hoped that they could improve their conditions through negotiation. All these hopes rode on the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. The Accords began a process of negotiations, over five years, based on agreed upon and clearly stated principles. These principles, detailed within the Accords, included adherence to UN Security Council resolution 242, which called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and “political independence of every State in the area.” The Accords also clearly state that “negotiations on the permanent status [of Palestine] will lead to implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.”
Though the Oslo Accords were never meant to be a final agreement, they made it clear that before 1998 Israel would have to begin withdrawing its settlements some way or another and return to the 1967 borders. In return, the Palestinian Liberation Organization renounced their claim to 78% of historic Palestine, recognized Israel and renounced violence against their Israeli occupiers. All that just to begin negotiations that were supposed to result in basic adherence to Geneva Convention Article 49 and the United Nations–something Palestinians should not have to negotiate for in the first place.
Yitzhak Rabin, the architect of the Oslo Accords, was assassinated by an Israeli opponent of the Accords. We’ll never know if he could have actually negotiated a peaceful partition.
With Rabin–the main proponent of actual peace–dead, Benjamin Netanyahu shortly became Prime Minister. He promised to “prevent a Palestinian state” while on the campaign trail and after assuming office. He succeeded in doing so. At the end of the Accords’ five-year window there were 50,000 more settlers living in the West Bank than before. The PLO meanwhile had upheld their commitment against violence. The group is still peaceful to this day. Other groups carried out violence against Israel after 1993– not the PLO. To this day, Netanyahu brags that, “I’m proud that I prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state.”
In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak started the Camp David summit by declaring that Resolution 242 does not apply to the West Bank, effectively proclaiming the Oslo Accords dead, even to liberal Israelis. Since then, the illegal and militarily-enforced Israeli presence in the West Bank has tripled. No wonder some in Gaza are skeptical of the “peace process.”
Indeed, one could argue the unilateral failure of the Oslo Accords handed Gaza to Hamas. When the Accords left the West Bank defenseless, Hamas got to say we told you so. Their popularity in the 2006 Palestinian election marked an extreme ideological shift among Palestinians in the occupied territories, most of whom believed in the Oslo Accords thirteen years before.
Hamas’ Partial Victory
Make no mistake about it–Hamas is ruthless, cagey and opportunistic. All this comes as Saudi Arabia is preparing to recognize Israel, further legitimizing and cementing their occupation. Saudi Arabia would be the sixth Arab nation to recognize Israel, signaling to Palestinians the abandonment of their cause by the Arab rulers who once promised to protect them. If nothing else, the October 7th attack has succeeded in postponing Saudi Arabia’s negotiations with Israel, which some in Hamas would consider a success. Khalil Al-Hayya, deputy head of Hamas’s Gaza politburo, said in an interview with the New York Times that “We succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back on the table, and now no one in the region is experiencing calm.”
In politics and war, timing is everything. A Fieldston history teacher commented that “The attack also followed an unprecedented period of turmoil and division within Israeli society. As a result of Netanyahu’s policies in the West Bank, as a result of his attempts to subvert Israel’s Supreme Court, his many attempts to duck or tamp down the criminal charges against him, civil society seemed to be on the brink of civil war last spring. Massive demonstrations, hundreds of thousands of protestors, took to the streets for months. Military reservists, critical of Netanyahu and the extreme religious right and settler movements, were talking about refusing to fight in the next war if Israeli democracy was destroyed. To Israel’s enemies, this domestic calamity represented the perfect time to strike.”
The Path to Real Peace
Hamas has made it clear that they are willing to face annihilation because the alternative is so bleak. Hamas and their supporters believe, with some evidence, that Israel was never serious about peace. Complacency means accepting the slow annexation of the West Bank and the slow starvation of Gaza. Although Hamas has no qualms with violent action, if Palestinians had a plausible path to a complete, independent, and thriving state–if Israel took steps to withdraw their settlers, end the blockade of Gaza, and strengthen rather than undermine the fledgling institutions of Palestinian self-governance–the equation would be different. Palestinians would have a third option, besides slow deterioration or martyrdom.
I believe–and official American policy has held for 50 years–that is how a lasting peace can be achieved. Israel does not need to wait for a “peace partner” or gradual negotiations just to follow international laws that they should have followed to begin with. If Israel withdrew its settlements and ended its blockade, Hamas’ rhetoric that Israel has never wanted peace would collapse entirely.
The path to peace requires Israel to quit stalling and begin complying with international law (Geneva Convention Article 49 and UNSC resolution 242). The path to peace does not require or include the destruction of the most popular governing body of Palestinians: Hamas.
Even if Israel does somehow destroy Hamas, the idea of Hamas, the idea that armed resistance is the only way for Palestinians to defend themselves and their aspirations for self-determination, is growing more popular among Arabs and Palestinians every day the war rages on. Even in Gaza, their approval holds strong in the few polls that have been conducted. Hamas flags are flying across the West Bank. Even Biden declared that Israel is “starting to lose that support by the indiscriminate bombing that takes place.” Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has denounced Netanyahu’s war on Gaza. Israel’s devastating response has made the idea of armed resistance more powerful among Palestinians and across the Arab world than it was on October 6th.
Those who believe the plight of Gaza is an entirely religious conflict say that the only path to peace is the destruction of Hamas, regardless of civilian cost. Many have similarly espoused the belief that Israel has a right to perpetually escalate in the name of self-defense. In this spirit, Israel has displaced 80% of Gazans, destroyed half of the homes in Gaza and killed over 20,000 people, 70% of which are women and children. Describing the situation Israel has created in Gaza, the head of the world food program said, “In my life, I’ve never seen anything like this in terms of severity, in terms of scale, and then in terms of speed.” Netanyahu has even declared that Israel will remain in Gaza even after the war is over.
What if Hamas, or a similar armed group, rises from the ashes of Gaza, their numbers bolstered by the thousands of orphans and refugees created in the recent war, and wants to exercise their right to self-defense? Would it be Israel’s right to then destroy Gaza so that no more terrorists may spawn? What if some of the millions of Palestinians in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and the West Bank want to avenge their Gazan brothers? Should Israel destroy them all too? A “peace” built on this level of destruction and fear is not a peace to aspire towards.
Pictured: Netanyahu and Biden’s “peace plan”
